Disputations with Pyrrhus

Record of the inquiry that took place concerning the controversies that had been raised about the ecclesiastical dogmas, in the presence of Gregory, the most pious patrician, and the most holy bishops gathered with him, and the rest of the God-loving and illustrious men, between Pyrrhus, the former patriarch of Constantinople, and Maximus, the most devout monk, in the month of July, in the third indiction. Pyrrhus was defending the innovation introduced by himself and by his predecessor in Byzantium—that is, the doctrine of one will—while Maximus was advocating the patristic and apostolic teaching that has come down to us from of old. Through the aforementioned extraordinary man—I mean Gregory, the most honorable patrician—the said men, that is, Pyrrhus and Maximus, were brought face to face with one another. Pyrrhus initiated the discussion with Maximus, speaking as follows:

Pyrrhus: What harm have we done to you, lord abba Maximus—both I and my predecessor—that you thus everywhere disparage us, giving everyone a heretical opinion of us? And who, even though we were unknown to you by face-to-face sight, has ever so honored or revered you as we have?

Maximus: Since God is listening, no one—to use your own words—has so honored or revered me as you have. But now that you have set aside the Christian dogma, I considered it a fearful thing to prefer your favor toward me over the truth.

Pyrrhus: For by holding what opinion have we repudiated the phronema of the Christians?

Maximus: By holding that there is one will of the divinity of Christ and of His humanity—and not only holding this, but also, to the corruption of the entire body of the holy Church, setting this forth through a new Ecthesis.

Pyrrhus: What then? Does the one who professes a single will of Christ seem to you to have deviated from Christian teaching?

Maximus: Most certainly. For what could be more impious than to say that the same one, by one and the same will, before the incarnation brought all things into being out of non-being, holds them together, provides for them, and guides them toward salvation; but after the incarnation desires food and drink, moves from place to place, and does all the other things which lie beyond any slander or reproach—things through which he also showed the economy to be free from all illusion?

Pyrrhus: Is Christ one, or not?

Maximus: Yes, one, manifestly.

Pyrrhus: If, then, Christ is one, then surely as one He also willed; and if He willed as one, then surely His will is also one, and not two.

Maximus: To say something without first distinguishing the meanings of what is said is nothing other than to confuse everything and to be eager to leave unclear the very matters under investigation—which is unbecoming of a learned man. So tell me this: Christ, being one, is He God only, or man only, or both together, God and man at once?

Pyrrhus: Obviously, God and man together.

Maximus: Since Christ is God and man by nature, did he will as God and man—the same one—or only as Christ? If Christ willed primarily as God and man, then clearly he who is one and the same willed in a twofold manner, not a singular one. For if Christ is nothing other than his natures, from which and in which he exists, then manifestly, as befits his own natures—that is, as each is by nature—he, being one and the same, both willed and acted, since neither of his natures is without will or without activity. And if Christ willed and acted in a manner befitting his own natures—that is, as each is by nature—and his natures are two, then his natural wills are altogether two as well, along with the essential energies equal in number to them. For just as the number of the natures of one and the same Christ, when piously understood and spoken of, does not divide Christ but demonstrates that the difference of the natures is preserved even in the union, so too the number of the wills and energies that essentially belong to his natures—for, as has been said, he who is one and the same was possessed of will and activity according to both his natures for our salvation—does not introduce division (God forbid!), but merely makes known their preservation and safeguarding even in the union.

Pyrrhus: It is impossible that wills be introduced without those who will being introduced along with them.

Maximus: This very thing, too, is irrational in your writings: moved not by reason but by authority, you issued your declaration, taking Heraclius as your accomplice in this, because you colluded with his unlawful and illicit union and ratified it with your blessing. For if it be granted that those who will are to be introduced along with the wills, then surely, by the reasonable converse, the wills will also be introduced along with those who will. And according to you it will be found that, in the case of the superessential and supremely good and blessed Godhead: on account of its one will, the hypostasis is also one, as Sabellius held; but on account of the three persons, the wills are likewise three, and therefore the natures also three, as Arius held — if indeed, according to the patristic definitions and canons, a difference of wills introduces a difference of natures.

Pyrrhus: It is impossible for two wills to coexist with one another in a single person without opposition.

Maximus: If it is not possible for two wills to exist in one and the same person without opposition, then according to you it is possible with opposition. But if so, you have at least conceded that there are two; and you do not disagree about the number, but only about the opposition. It remains, then, to investigate the cause that produces the conflict. What, then, do you say this cause is? Is it the natural will, or is it sin? If you say it is the natural will—and we know no other author of this will than God—then according to you, God is the creator of the conflict. But if it is sin—and He committed no sin—then the God who became enfleshed had no opposition whatsoever between His natural wills. For when the cause does not exist, clearly neither will the effect.