Eusebius of Caesarea · c. 313-320 AD
288 of 399
Section 51
'COME then, if we ought ever to invoke divine aid, let us do so now: let the gods be invoked with all earnestness to come to the demonstration of their own existence; and let us hold fast to this as a sure cable in embarking upon our present argument.
When I am questioned upon matters of this kind, it seems to be the safest course to answer such questions in the following manner.
'When any one says to me, Stranger, are all things at rest, and nothing in motion, or the very contrary? Or are some of them in motion, and some at rest? Some I suppose are in motion, I shall say, and some at rest. Is there not then some place in which the fixed are at rest, and the moving move?
'Of course.
'And some, I suppose, would move in one single place, and others in more than one.
'Do you mean, I shall say, that the things which are in the condition of rest at the centre move in one single place, just as the circumference of circles revolves, though the circles are said to be at rest?
'Yes.'
And afterwards he adds:
'Let us further state it in the following way, and answer ourselves again. If all things were somehow combined in one mass at rest, as most of such philosophers are bold enough to say, which of the above-mentioned kinds of motion must first arise among them?
'Of course the self-moving: for unless there were previously some change in themselves, they could never begin to change from any external cause.
'As the beginning then of all motions, and the first which arises in things at rest and continues in things in motion, the self-moving, we must say, is necessarily the eldest and mightiest of all changes; and that which is changed by another, and itself moves others, is the second.
'Most true.
'Since therefore we have reached this stage of the argument, let us make the following answer.
'What answer?
'If we see this self-motion take place anywhere in the element of earth, or water, or fire, whether separate or combined, what condition shall we say exists in such element?
'Do you ask me whether we shall say that it is alive, when it moves itself?
'Yes.
'It is alive, of course.
'And again, when we see soul in any thing, must we admit that this has a different or the same life as the former?
'The same, and no other.
'Stay then, in heaven's name. Should you not wish to understand three points about every thing?
'What do you mean?
'One, the essence; and one, the definition of the essence; and one, the name: and further, that there are two questions concerning everything that exists.
'How two?
'Sometimes one puts forward the name alone and asks for the definition, and at another time one puts forward the definition alone and asks the name. Are we then willing now again to make a statement of the following kind?
'Of what kind?
'There is, I suppose, something divisible into two equal parts in other things as well as in number. And the name of this that is divisible in number is "even," and its definition is "number divisible into two equal parts."
'Yes.
'It is something of this kind that I am trying to explain. 'Is it not the same thing of which we speak in either way, whether on being asked for the definition we give the name, or being asked for the name we give the definition, since it is the same thing that we speak of by name as "even," and by definition as "number divisible into two equal parts "?
'Yes, certainly.
'What then is the definition of that which has the name "soul"? Have we any other except that which was stated just now, "the motion which has the power of moving itself "?
'Do you mean to say that the definition "self-moving " implies the same essence as the name, which we all call "soul "?
'That is what I say. And if this is so, do we any longer feel the want of a sufficient proof that soul is the same as the first creative and moving principle of all things that are, and have been, and shall be, and again of all their contraries, since it has been shown to be the cause of all change and motion?
'We want no more: but it has been most satisfactorily proved that soul is the oldest of all things, as having been the beginning of motion.
'Is not then the motion which is produced in one thing because of another, but never presents any self-motion, being in reality a change of a soul-less body, of secondary rank or of a rank as far removed as any number by which one may choose to reckon it?
'Rightly so.
'Should we then have said rightly and properly and with the most perfect truth that soul has existed before body, or not, and that body is secondary and comes after soul, as according to nature the governed comes after the governing principle?
'Yes, with the most perfect truth.
'Do we however remember that we admitted in the former part, that, if soul should be found to be older than body, the things of the soul would also be older than those of the body?
'Yes, certainly.
'Then characters, and moral habits, and wishes, and reasonings, and true opinions, and acts of attention and memory must have existed earlier than length, and breadth, and depth, and strength of bodies, if soul was prior to body.
'Necessarily.
'Must we then necessarily admit what follows immediately on this, that soul is the cause of good and evil, and honourable and base, and just and unjust, and of all opposites, if at least we are to assume it to be the cause of all things?
'Of course.
'Must we not say then that, as soul governs and inhabits all things that move in any way, it governs the heaven also?
'Certainly.
'One soul, or more? More than one, I will answer for you both. Not less than two at least we must suppose, the beneficent, and that which has power to work evil. You have spoken very rightly.
'Well, to proceed. Soul then conducts all things in heaven, and earth, and sea by her own movements, the names of which are will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion right or wrong, joy, sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, affection, and all movements either akin to these or primary, which again taking with them the secondary movements of bodies lead all things to growth and decay, and separation and combination, and their attendant conditions of heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hard and soft, white and black, bitter and sweet, and all things by use of which the soul, which is divine, taking ever with her the divine mind, conducts all things rightly and happily, but, if she allies herself with folly, works all the contrary effects to these. Are we to assume that these things are so, or have we still a doubt whether they may not be otherwise?
'By no means.
'Which kind then of soul, are we to say, rules over heaven and earth and their whole circuit? That which is full of wisdom and virtue, or that which possesses neither? Are you willing that we should answer this as follows?
'How?
'If on the one hand, my excellent friend, we are to say, the whole path of heaven and the course of all things therein has a nature similar to the movement and revolution and reasonings of mind, and proceeds in a manner akin thereto, we must evidently say, that the best kind of soul takes care of the whole world, and guides it on that best path.
'True.
'But if it proceeds in an insane and disorderly manner, we must say that the evil soul is guiding it.
'This too is most true.
'What then is the nature of the movement of mind? Now in answering this question, my friends, it is difficult to speak wisely. And for this reason it is fair that I too should help you now in the answer.
'You say well.
'Let us then not frame our answer as if looking straight at the sun and bringing on ourselves darkness at noonday, by supposing that we shall ever see mind with mortal eyes, and know it thoroughly. It is safer to observe the subject of our inquiry by looking upon an image of it.
'How do you mean?
'Of those ten kinds of motion let us take as its image that which mind resembles; and when I have helped you to remember this, I will frame our common answer.
'You could not speak better.
'Well then of our former discourse we remember thus much at least, that of all things we supposed some to be in motion, and some at rest.
'Yes.
'And again of those that were in motion we supposed some to more in one place only, and others in more than one, as they were carried along.
'That is so.
'Of these two motions then that whose course is always in one place must necessarily move round some centre, like the wheels on a lathe, and must be in every way as much as possible akin and similar to the revolving motion of the mind.
'How do you mean?
'Surely if we say that mind and the motion which goes on in one place both move according to the same conditions, and in the same manner, and in the same course, and round the same centres, and towards the same direction, and according to one law and one order, like the motions of a top, we should never be shown to be bad word-painters of beautiful images.
'What you say is very right.
'Well then this other motion which never proceeds in the same manner, nor according to the same conditions, nor in the same course, nor round the same centres, nor towards the same direction, nor in one place, nor in proportion, nor order, nor any law, must be akin to every kind of folly.
'Most truly it must.
'Now then there is no longer any difficulty in saying expressly, that since soul is that which carries all things round for us, we must of necessity affirm that the revolution of the heaven is carried on by the care and arrangement either of the best soul or of the worse.
'But according to what has now been said, O Stranger, it would be impious to say otherwise than that soul or souls endowed with every virtue carry them round.
'You have paid admirable attention to my arguments, Cleinias. But listen further to the following.
'What?
'If soul carries all things round, sun and moon and the stars too, does she not also carry round each one of them?
'Of course.
'Then concerning one of them let us argue in a manner which we shall find applicable to all the heavenly bodies.
'Which one?
'Every man sees the sun's body, but no one sees his soul, nor yet the soul of any animal's body, either in life or after death. There is, however, much reason to suppose that this nature of soul invests all our bodily senses though utterly imperceptible thereby to us, but is apprehended by mind alone. By mind therefore and by thought let us grasp the following notion of it.
'What kind of notion?
'If soul carries the sun round, we shall not be far wrong in saying that it does one of three things.
'What three?
'That either dwelling within this circular body that we see the soul carries it such as it is safely through in every direction, as our soul carries us about every way; or having from some external source provided herself with a body of fire or a kind of air, as some say, she forcibly drives body by body; or thirdly, being herself without a body, but endowed with certain other exceedingly wonderful powers, she so guides his course.
'Yes.
'This so far must be true, that soul directs all things by one or other of these operations.'
These then are the statements of our philosopher in the tenth Book of the Laws. But hear how he arranges the same thought in the Philebus also:
[PLATO] 'All the wise men say with one voice, in reality magnifying themselves, that mind is our king of heaven and earth. And perhaps they are right. But, if you please, let us conduct our examination of the general nature of mind more at length.
'Speak in whatever way you please, Socrates, thinking nothing of length on our account, as you will not be wearisome, to us.
'You say well. Let us then begin our further inquiries in the following manner.
'How?
'Whether ought we to assert, Protarchus, that all things and this so-called universe are under the guardianship of the irrational and purposeless force, and mere hap-hazard; or that, on the contrary, as those before us used to say, mind and wisdom of some marvellous kind arrange and govern them?
'They are utterly different assertions, O noble Socrates. For the opinion which you mention seems to me to be impious. But the assertion that mind arranges them all is worthy of the aspect of the world, and of sun and moon and stars and the whole circuit of heaven, and for my part I would never speak nor even think of them otherwise.
'Are you willing then that we also should assent to what was agreed on by those before us, that these things are so? And not merely think that we must state the opinions of others without risk to ourselves, but also share the danger and bear part of the blame, when some clever man asserts that these things are not as we say but all in disorder?
'Of course I should be willing.
'Come then, scan carefully the argument on this subject which now encounters us.
'Only state it.
'Do we discern in the constitution of the world the elements belonging to the nature of the bodies of all living things, fire and water and air and "land," as the storm-tossed sailors say?
'Certainly. For we are verily tossed by storms of perplexity in our present discussions.
'Well then, concerning each of the elements existing in us, take a statement of this kind.
'What?
'That each of these as existing in us is small, and weak, and in no respect at all pure, and without a power worthy of its nature: and having admitted this in one, conceive the same of all. As for instance there is fire, I suppose, in us, and fire in the universe.
'Of course.
'Is not then the part that is in us small and weak, and mean, but that which is in the universe wonderful both in quantity and beauty, and in every kind of power that belongs to fire?
'What you say is very true.
'Again, is the fire of the universe generated and fed and ruled by this fire that is in us, or on the contrary is it from that fire that mine and yours and that of all other animals receives all these services?
'This question does not even require an answer.
'Quite right. You will say the same then, I suppose, concerning the earth that is here in the animals and that which is in the universe; and so of all the other elements about which I asked just now you will give this same answer.
'Yes, for who would ever be thought to be in his right mind, if he answered otherwise?
'No one probably. But now follow the next point. For when we saw all these elements now mentioned combined in one, did we not call it a body?
'Of course.
'Assume the same then in regard also to this which we call the world: for because of the same process it must be a body, being composed out of the same elements.
'What you say is very right.
'Is then our body nourished wholly from this body, or does this receive from ours its nourishment and all the further services which we just now mentioned in reference to them?
'This is another question, Socrates, not worth asking.
'But what of the following? Is it worth asking? Or what will you say?
'Say what it is.
'Shall we not say that this body of ours has a soul?
'Of course we shall say so.
'Whence, my dear Protarchus, did it get a soul, unless indeed the body of the universe had a soul, inasmuch as it has all things the same as our body, and in every way more beautiful?
'Evidently from no other source, Socrates.
'For surely we do not think, O Protarchus, that those four classes, the finite, the infinite, their compound, and cause which exists as a fourth class in all things,—that this, which in our bodies supplies a soul, and endows it with the art of exercising the body and healing it when it has fallen ill, and makes various arrangements and remedies in various parts, is to be called entire and complete wisdom; but that, though these same elements exist in the heaven as a whole, and in its great divisions, in more beauty and purity, it has not contrived to create in these the nature of all that is most beautiful and noble.
'Nay, this would be in every way unreasonable.
'If then this is denied, would it not be better for us, with that other argument as our guide, to say, that, as we have often said, there is in the world a vast infinity and an efficient limit, and over them a cause of no little power, ordering and arranging years, and seasons, and months, which cause is most justly called wisdom and mind?
'Most justly indeed.
'Wisdom however and mind could never exist without soul.
'No indeed.
'Will you not say then that through the power of the cause there is implanted in the nature of Zeus a kingly soul and a kingly mind: and in other gods other noble qualities, according to the names by which they like each to be called?'