Praeparatio Evangelica (The Preparation of the Gospel)

[XENOPHON] 'No one ever yet saw Socrates do or heard him say anything impious or unholy. For he did not discourse about the nature of the universe or the other subjects, like most of them, speculating upon the condition of the cosmos, as the Sophists call it, and by what forces of necessity the celestial phenomena severally are produced: rather he used to expose the foolishness of those who troubled themselves about such things.

'And the first point he used to consider in regard to them was, whether they go on to study such matters, because they think that they have already an adequate knowledge of human affairs, or deem that they are doing their proper work in neglecting human interests and speculating on the divine.

'And he used to wonder that they did not clearly see that it is impossible for men to discover these things, since even those who pride themselves most highly on the discussion of these matters do not agree in opinion with each other, but are just like madmen in their mutual feelings.

'For as among madmen some have no fear even of things fearful, while others are afraid where no fear is; so some of these think it. no shame to say or do anything and everything even in a crowd, while others think it not right even to go out among men: and some honour neither temple, nor altar, nor anything else belonging to the gods, while others worship any casual stocks and stones and wild beasts. Also of those who study anxiously the nature of the universe some think that "being" is only one, others that it is infinite in multitude: some too think that all things are in perpetual motion, and others that nothing can ever be moved: and some that all things are being generated and perishing, but others that nothing could ever be generated or perish.

'He also used to ask the following questions about them: whereas those who study human affairs think that whatever they have learned they will be able to practise both for themselves and for whomsoever they may wish, do those who search after things divine think in like manner that when they know by what forces of necessity phenomena are severally produced, they will be able whenever they please to make winds and rains and seasons, and whatever else of this kind they may need? Or, without even hoping for anything of this sort, are they satisfied merely to know how such phenomena are severally produced?

'Such, then, was the nature of his remarks about those who busied themselves with these matters: but he himself was always discoursing of human interests, inquiring what was, pious, what impious; what noble, what base; what just, what unjust; what sanity, what madness.'

These, then, were the opinions of Socrates. And next after him Aristippus of Cyrene, and then later Ariston of Chios, undertook to maintain that morals were the only proper subject of philosophy; for these inquiries were practicable and useful, but the discussions about nature were quite the contrary, neither being comprehensible, nor having any use, even if they were clearly understood.

For it would be no advantage to us, not even if soaring higher in the air than Perseus,

'O'er ocean's wave, and o'er the Pleiades,' we could with our very eyes survey the whole world, and the nature of all 'beings,' of whatever kind that is.

For we certainly shall not be on that account wiser, or more just or brave or temperate, nay, not even strong, or beautiful, or rich, without which advantages happiness is impossible.

Wherefore Socrates was right in saying that of existing things some are above us, and others nothing to us: for the secrets of nature are above us, and the conditions after death nothing to us, but the affairs of human life alone concern us.

And thus, he said, he also dismissed the physical theories of Anaxagoras and Archelaus, and studied only

'Whate'er of good or ill our homes have known.'

And he thought besides that their physical discussions were not merely difficult and even impossible, but also impious and opposed to the laws. For some maintained that gods do not exist at all, and others, that the Infinite, or Being, or the One, are gods, and anything rather than those who are generally acknowledged.

Their dissension again, he said, was very great: for some represented the All as infinite, and others as finite; and some maintained that all things are in motion, and others that nothing at all moves.

Moreover the following words of Timon of Phlius in his Silli seem to me the best of all on these very subjects:

'Say then, who urged them to the fatal strife? Echo's attendant rout: who filled with wrath Against the silent, sent upon mankind A fell disease of talk, and many died.'

Do you see how at last these noble sages scoff at each other? For instance, the same author, besides what I have quoted, describes their mutual jealousy and their battles and quarrels in the following style:

'There baneful Discord stalks with senseless shriek, Of murderous Strife the sister and ally, Who, blindly stumbling round, anon her head, With ponderous weight set firm, uplifts to hope.'

Since, however, we have now exhibited the dissension and fighting of these sages among themselves, and since the wholly superfluous, and unintelligible, and to us utterly unnecessary study and learning of all the other subjects in which the tribes of philosophers still take pride, have been refuted not by our demonstrations but by their own; nay more, since we have also plainly set forth the reason why we have rejected their doctrines and preferred the Hebrew oracles, let us at this point conclude our treatise on The Preparation for the Gospel; but the more complete treatise on The Demonstration of the Gospel it now remains for us to consider from a different basis of argument, which the question still needs for those who are to deal with its teaching.

It remains, therefore, to make answer to those of the circumcision who find fault with us, as to why we, being foreigners and aliens, make use of their books, which, as they would say, do not belong to us at all; or why, if we gladly accept their oracles, we do not also render our life conformable to their law.